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Preface
• Initial system design, implementation, verification, and flight testing has been conducted.  As 
of yet detailed data review is incomplete, and flight testing has been limited to initial monitor 
force fights.  Detailed monitor flight evaluations have yet to be performed.  Initial preliminary 
findings are being discussed in this package.  They are not final.
• Lessons learned guidance is preliminary as well and attempts have been made to tailor them 
to generic Multi-Monitor Run-Time Assurance (MMRTA).  Guides are expected to be 
developed once more detailed testing / analysis has been performed.
Outline
• Expandable Variable Autonomous Architecture (EVAA) Phase 1A Description
– Phase 1A Scope 
– Hardware 
– Software
• Findings from EVAA Phase 1A 
– Requirements Development
– Design Development 
– Test Approach
• Verification Testing
• Flight Test
• Standard Practice Review
– Review of ASTM standard practice
– Considerations for autonomous systems certification framework / approach
• Next Steps
– Now to 31 Aug 17
– Potential Later Phases
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EVAA Phase 1A Description
Phase 1 / 1A Scope
• Phase 1, Oct 2016-Sept 2017, Develop and evaluate an MMRTA system utilizing 
memory/database of terrain & obstacles (e.g., not onboard sensors)
– Low risk, rapid prototyping approach for Phase 1 drove low cost, ~small sUAS
• Resulted in light payload capability (<3 lbs), no onboard sensor capability
– Demonstration of EVAA / MMRTA concept
• Phase 1A:  Complete at least 1 flight test of a MMRTA test case involving command conflicts 
(i.e., simultaneous safety monitor/recovery controller command requests)
– ~June 2017: Provide our findings to the ASTM WK53403 Standards Practice Report:  Methods to 
Safely Bound Flight Behavior of UAS Containing Adaptive Algorithms
– Assess performance of the Moral Compass
• Phase 1B:  Evaluate Monitor/Recovery and Moral Compass performance
– ~Sept 2017: Provide our findings to the ASTM WK53403 Standards Practice Report:  Requirements 
Guide, Evaluation Guide, & Design Guide
• Phase II:  (~FY18) Add Onboard sensors, aircraft detect & avoid, person avoidance
– Larger aircraft, ~9-10 lbs payload capability, >30 min endurance
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• Objective:   
– Conduct Phase 1A testing to verify EVAA functionality for first time and with goal to assess Moral 
Compass “force fight”.
• Result:  
– Met objective (tested GCAS and GeoFence functionalities including a Moral Compass force fight).   
• Conducted ~17 runs for GCAS testing (included  repeats due to team learning best method to 
setup the loiter portion of runs and transitions to the test profile run-ins, and assessing 
unexpected GCAS avoidances).   
• Conducted 2 runs of GeoFence – demonstrating its functionality.  
• Conducted 2 runs of a Multi-Monitor test profile: obstacle avoidance (GCAS) versus airspace 
avoidance (GeoFence) Moral Compass force fight. 
• GPS jamming being conducted in the Utah range may have influenced some of our data runs 
sporadically.
First Flight Day, 3 May 2017, Mission 23
• Objective:   
– Conduct Phase 1A testing to verify EVAA functionality in an environment without GPS jamming (1st 
flight had GPS jamming in Utah, which did appear to affect our data) and following software fixes 
made to address discrepancies from EVAA flight #1 that occurred on 3 May.
• Result:  
– Met objective, flew all cards, including multi-monitor fights with GCAS, GeoFence, and Forced 
Landing System.     
• 26 test profiles conducted.    
• A few anomalies noted with GCAS (recovers 20-30 ft lower altitude than expected and appears 
to avoid ~ 2 sec later than expected). Team surmised there could be a difference between the 
onboard map location vs where aircraft thinks it is vs obstacle locations placed via Google 
Earth.   
Note:  Demonstrated system worked, met Objective of Phase 1A:  “Complete at 
least 1 flight test of a MMRTA test case involving command conflicts” 
Second Flight Day, 18 May 2017, Mission 24
– BirdsEyeView (BEV) Firefly 6 
• Cost:  $5,999.00 (fully assembled by manufacturer)
• ~$2500 (if you build it yourself) 
– Hardware
• COTS FireFLY6 by BEV Aerobotics
• COTS Pixhawk autopilot hardware with BEV proprietary software
• COTS FireFLY6 Planner Ground Station Software
• COTS RC Controller
• ODROID XU4 (EVAA is hosted on the ODROID) 
– USB connection to Pixhawk for autopilot interface
– Features & Specifications
• Vertical takeoff and landing with fixed wing flight mode
• Flight Modes – Stabilize, Alt Hold, Loiter, Land, Return-To-Launch, Waypoint
• Effectively constant airspeed of 30-35kts
• Max Vertical Velocity of ~ +/-10fps
• Max Bank Angle of +/- 40deg
Baseline Aircraft
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Simplified Traveler System Hardware Architecture
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EVAA Software System Description
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Coupler
(Moral Compass)
*Note:  Recovery maneuvers are contained within monitors, but may be updated via 
configuration file for modularity / adaptability across platforms.
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EVAA Software Description
• Flight Executive
– Moral Compass: Chooses the safety/recovery monitor with highest consequence command from all 
of the safety monitors to pass to the coupler.  (Consequence: estimated non-dimensionalized
monetary penalty if requested monitor action not acted upon)
• OLIV: Checks to ensure valid command and consequences reported by the safety monitors
– Scheduler: Creates and schedules threads for all periodic tasks. 
– Coupler: Translates generic commands from the Moral Compass to specific autopilot commands.
– CVT: Current Value Table of parameters used as common data set for all EVAA elements 
• SWIM: Checks the integrity of data used as inputs
• Monitors
– GCAS: Prevents collisions with stationary objects (terrain, features and obstacles)
– GeoFence: Prevents intrusion into designated 3-D airspace
– Forced Landing System: Detects an inflight fault and lands as soon as possible in the safest 
location possible. 
• Support Functions
– Map Manager: Provides map data to the rest of the system.
– Trajectory Manager: Prepares a kinematic trajectory prediction. 
– Wind Calcs: Performs inflight wind estimation based on aircraft track dynamics.
• Flight Test Module: Provides an interface to perform flight tests safely.
Findings From EVAA Phase 1A
Requirements Development
Phase 1A Requirements Development
(How Did We Do It)
• Early on the team spent a significant amount of time discussing the system and associated 
requirements.
– In the beginning the team had difficulty categorizing requirements.  (i.e. appropriate levels within a 
system decomposition)
• In retrospect there were multiple systems of requirements being looked at (test enabling 
systems, EVAA system, etc)
– A decision was made to proceed with the team’s common understanding of the system into design. 
• Part of the research being conducted included developing guidance on development and 
evolution of requirements for this type of system, however this was not the entirety of the 
research.  Each aspect had to be allotted time and limited to fit within the window.
• As the design progressed requirements were re-visited
– Flight vehicle platform and associated hardware were previously set
– EVAA hardware (ODROID) was set 
– Focused on EVAA Software Requirements & Traveler GCS Requirements
Phase 1A Traveler System Decomposition
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EVAA System Decomposition
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EVAA System Decomposition
Levied Requirements for a Generic (multiple platform, multiple monitor) System
• Monitors
– Requirements for Monitor developers to interface properly with EVAA
• Levied on Platform
– Summation of platform specific requirements for EVAA to function properly
• Hardware interface requirements 
– Mechanical, Power, Communication
• Sensor requirements
– Both monitor specific and common state data
• Command interface requirements
– Types and formats of commands EVAA must be able to send
» Note: For the system to work, all of the autopilot specifics do not need to be provided, 
what is needed are a few (simple) specific commands and vehicle responses to those 
commands for avoidance maneuvers.  
What Did We Learn – Requirements Development
• Systems of requirements need to marry well (EVAA System, Simulation, Vehicle Platform)
• One common data module / interface is essential for integrating multiple monitors (CVT)
• Configuration files allow for flexibility / expandability
– CVT JSON file to set list of parameters
– GCAS / GeoFence config files to set vehicle maneuvers
• Modular architecture with common generic elements allows specific element development / 
modification with limited regression testing / verification.
– Strive to be as simple as possible while meeting requirements. Avoid unnecessary complexity in 
code and design of safety systems
• Monitors should be kept independent (with guidance from requirements on how to interface 
with the MMRTA architecture) 
– They should not communicate with each other
– They should each only mitigate one safety risk
– They should run fast enough to respond faster than the situation can unfold
What Did We Learn – Requirements Development
• Decision logic for monitor fights (Moral Compass) is crucial to ensure safe function and could 
easily get complex
– Consequence method (based on non-dimensionalized dollar impact) simplifies this problem
– Decisions only need to be made at rates which the combined system (MMRTA and vehicle) can 
respond to
• Flight test enabling requirements need to be carried throughout but kept modular.
– Need to include flight test specific software (ground and flight) that can be removed after testing 
complete
• Early consideration of timing constraints is essential.
• Map data storage (indexing and datum) and usage needs to be clearly defined in the 
requirements provided to monitor developers. 
– Where in a tile does the lat, lon address actually exist?
– If map lookup area is too small relative to the post resolution, the area can fit between the posts and 
not capture required elevation data.
– The horizontal and vertical datum used by the telemetry available from the vehicle should be 
verified to match the map databases used by the system.
Findings From EVAA Phase 1A
Design Development
Phase 1 EVAA Design Effort
(How Did We Do It)
• Team decided to use object oriented (C++) language to simplify modularity of design.
– Typically certified safety critical software would not use object oriented languages due to availability 
of certified tools for evaluation.
• Software Architecture was established
– Defined:  Base Classes, APIs, Extensible Data Exchange Formats
• Coding style guide and naming conventions were set
• Basic ODROID operating system and packages, and development environment were 
established
• Major modules were designed first (Flight Executive, CVT, Coupler, and Logger)
• System was broken into software modules then assigned to individual programmers
• Weekly stand up meeting set priorities for modules in work.
Design Philosophy
• Do no harm
– A Monitor acting alone should not be the cause of an incident
– With multiple Monitors, tackle the highest consequence first, minimizing harm
• Implementation should accommodate ease of verification
• Solve discrete problems rapidly
– Simple rules / monitors for specific situations
– Consequence dictates priority
• Keep the MMRTA system simple and deterministic, push complexity in to common mission 
manager systems
• Think organization (these types of systems can get complex, some software standards are 
key)
– Coding style guide and API guides were essential
– Naming conventions
• Safety Pilot can always take and keep control during testing
Design Considerations
• Unit testing at the module level prior to integration
• Minimize computational time to enable responsiveness in the system
– Simplified models used (example: kinematic models)
• Modular architecture with common generic elements
– Allows specific element development / modification with limited regression testing / verification.
– Expandability (E in EVAA)
– Examples: Trajectory prediction and Map Manager are common software elements used by multiple 
Monitors
• Keep the software simple
– Each module performs one task or function instead of several (avoid convolution)
• Decision logic for monitor fights (Moral Compass) design/implementation is the critical 
element that will establish the perceived behavior of the system to the public
What Did We Learn - Design
• Flight test enabling interfaces simplified verification testing / troubleshooting of the system
• The current system can get into avoidance loops
– EVAA is (as MMRTA should be) safety focused not mission focused
– The mission manager would / should alleviate this problem, but wasn’t the focus of the research.
• Simplicity and modularity in monitor design leads to shorter evaluation / response time which 
allows for flexibility in the complex function design (i.e. avoids nuisance triggers of the RTA)
– Each monitor only addresses one risk type
– Multiple monitors run simultaneously
– Monitors should not look too far into the future
• The further out they look the more uncertainty and associated nuisance triggers
• Dependent upon speed and maneuverability 
– Simple consequence-based Moral Compass – resulted in fast decisions which can accommodate 
growth to more monitors
What Did We Learn - Design
Certification –Considerations 
Safety & Design
– Imperative that MMRTA safety “wrapper” be deterministic (not per DO-178C definition, we mean 
known repeatable outcome)
• Let the Mission System employ high-order thinking, complex control … MMRTA /safety wrapper 
purpose is to guarantee understood behavior / reaction
• Limitations and assumptions of a MMRTA safety system (or monitor) should be well understood 
and documented (testers or operators should not be surprised by responses of the MMRTA 
safety system)
– Maneuvers, Monitor in control (risk logic), potential monitor force fight loops
Certification Flight Test Design Considerations
– Flight Test Data Requirements must be considered and accounted for in the design 
• Example:  Independent from the System Under Test (SUT) position & wind truth sources must be 
utilized during flight test
– Testing must include off-nominal conditions & should include testing outside operational envelope to 
evaluate system robustness
• Winds > mission ops limits > published op envelope;   GPS jamming;    reduced sensor visibility
• More off-nominal condition testing should be performed for higher risk operational conditions
– System robustness must be evaluated - Test matrix density, # of data samples 
• Driven by probability and confidence vs. consequence for total risk for a given system
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What Did We Learn - Design
EVAA / MMRTA Requirements & Design – Test Ops perspective
– Fully Understand the mission system and aircraft interfaces with the MMRTA system 
• If using a terrain database be sure to understand the impact of the source data upon the 
MMRTA system design:    i.e.,  is terrain data based on same axis system the aircraft uses? 
• Understand the accuracy of the COTS onboard state-space measurements (Euler angles, 
Rates, Accelerations, velocities, etc)
• If the system allows, use of virtual obstacles (GeoFences are by definition virtual) can 
greatly improve test efficiency and decrease risk
– Determine susceptibility of aircraft trajectory to environmental factors that affect vehicle 
performance such as winds and density altitude (does system counter winds automatically and
stay on desired track/position  … or not ?) and incorporate that consideration into the MMRTA 
design
– The MMRTA Monitor requirements are directly dependent upon the aircraft kinematics for 
avoidance
• An aircraft with small turn radius/low speed will likely have different MMRTA 
monitor/recovery requirements than a vehicle with large turn radius/high speed. 
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Findings From EVAA Phase 1A
Test Approach
Test Approach – Verification
(How Did We Do It)
• Unit testing at module level 
• Unit testing at integrated level 
• Source code inspections performed to supplement testing 
• HITL Simulation demonstrations and testing 
• Flight hardware ground combined systems testing
– Babble Testing & Pre-flight 
• Flight Testing
Babble / Fuzzer / Load Test
• Test resilience of autopilot (Pixhawk) receiving commands from EVAA hardware (ODROID)
– Random data, and random commands were sent at max rate to the autopilot
• Ensure that the autopilot is not overwhelmed with a backlog of commands
• Ensure that control is not taken from the safety pilot
• Ensure that the safety pilot can always take control
– Unique test software on external ODROID interfaced to autopilot
• Testing found multiple problem commands.
Test Approach – Verification
(What Did We Learn)
• Flight test enabling interfaces simplified verification testing & troubleshooting of the system
– Example:  Traveler GCS display allowed for real time assessments of performance in simulation
• Don’t assume the “advertised” baseline COTS aircraft performance if adding MMRTA to an 
existing aircraft – verify areas of need/interest
– Babble testing to ensure no unforeseen complications in data interface between system under test 
and COTS autopilot
– Autopilot control mode switch testing to ensure proper mode function and priority
Test Approach – Flight Test
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #3
Card #3:  GCAS –
Avoidance to the Right
• Avoidance: 30⁰ bank, 9 ft/sec climb
• No Horizontal Clearance Buffer 
• No wind compensation, penetrated obstacle
• Obstacle penetration:  wind?, or aircraft GPS 
position vs map position?
600’ Tall Walls
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 3 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #3
Card #4:  GCAS – With 100 ft Horiz
Buffer
Avoidance to the Right
• Avoidance: 30⁰ bank, 9 ft/sec climb
• No wind compensation
• Avoided Wall earlier than Card 3 (no buffer)
600’ Tall Walls
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 3 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
Predicted 
maneuver point
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #3
Card #6:  GCAS – Pinch Between 
Walls
• No Buffers
• Avoidance: 30⁰ bank, 9 ft/sec climb
• No wind compensation
• Cause of oblique wall penetration yet to be 
analyzed
600’ Tall Walls
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 5 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
Predicted 
maneuver point
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #3
Card #7:  GeoFence Avoidance
• No Horizontal Clearance Buffer
• Avoidance: 20⁰ bank, no climb
• No wind compensation
• GeoFence penetration:  wind?, or aircraft GPS 
position vs map position? – yet to be analyzed
600’ GeoFence 
Zone
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 4 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
Predicted 
maneuver point
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #3
Card #8: 1st Multi-Monitor Force 
Fight (GeoFence 1st)
GeoFence & GCAS Avoidance
• Per Moral Compass Consequence setting, 
EVAA should prioritize obstacles instead of 
GeoFence if both are “active”
• 50’ Horizontal Clearance Buffer on GeoFence, 
0’ on Obstacle
• GeoFence Avoidance: 20⁰ bank, no climb
• GCAS Avoidance: 30⁰ bank, 9 ft/sec climb
• No wind compensation
• Maneuver yet to be analyzed.
600’ GeoFence 
Zone
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 3 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
600’ Tall 
Walls
Note: GCAS is the 
EVAA-priority mode 
over GeoFence, as 
designed
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #4
Card #10: Multi-Monitor Force Fight 
(Obstacle 1st)
GeoFence & GCAS Avoidance
• 0’ Horizontal Clearance Buffer on GeoFence, 
50’ on Obstacle
• GeoFence Avoidance: 20⁰ bank, no climb
• GCAS Avoidance: 30⁰ bank, 9 ft/sec climb
• No wind compensation
• Obstacle penetration cause: yet to be 
analyzed
600’ GeoFence 
ZoneAimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 6 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
600’ Tall 
Walls
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #4
Card #12: FLS - Immediate Land 
Mode
• Looks 10 sec out, lands on lowest cost spot 
within 200 ft radius along aircraft’s true 
heading at time of initiation 
• FLS determined landing point was not a good 
location (sagebrush) (white path is pilot taking 
control)
• No wind compensationAimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 4 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
White: pilot control
EVAA, FLS 
Selected 
Landing Spot
Predicted 
maneuver point
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #5
Card #14: Multi-Monitor:  FLS-land 
here Mode vs GCAS 
• Per Moral Compass Consequence Setting, 
Obstacles should (and were) avoided during 
FLS
• FLS-land here mode:  landing spot selected by 
Ground Control operator
• No wind compensation
• 50’ Obstacle Horizontal Clearance Buffers
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 6 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
White: pilot control
EVAA, FLS 
Selected 
Landing Spot
Hard to discern color change, 
but EVAA is alternating between 
GCAS and FLS as a monitor 
fight
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #5
Card #15: Multi-Monitor:  FLS-land 
here Mode vs GeoFence
• Per Moral Compass Consequence setting, 
Aircraft should (and did) penetrate GeoFence 
during FLS – note trajectory colored remained 
Magenta (FLS = highest priority)
• FLS-land here mode:  landing spot selected by 
Ground Control operator
• No wind compensation
• No GeoFence Buffer
Aimpoint
Loiter Point
Wind: 4 knots
200 ft
Trajectory Colors:
Green: Waypoint Following
Red: GCAS 
Light Blue: GeoFence
Magenta: FLS (forced landing system)
EVAA, FLS 
Selected 
Landing Spot
Penetration of 
GeoFence, as 
designed
??
Mission 24, 18 May 2017 (EVAA #2)
Sortie #5
Card #16: Triple Multi-Monitor:  FLS-
land here Mode vs GeoFence vs 
GCAS
• Unfortunately, did not initiate a screen capture
Test Planning
– Don’t assume the “advertised” baseline COTS aircraft performance if adding MMRTA to an existing aircraft 
– verify areas of need/interest
• Compare aircraft envelope against Mission ops demand.    Example: If operating in Denver, consider 
Density-Altitude effects (see supporting briefing slides)
• Wind effects upon departure susceptibility, avoidance maneuvers, cruise performance
• Understand the accuracy of your COTS onboard state-space measurements (Euler angles, Rates, 
Accelerations, velocities, etc)
– Don’t always assume aircraft performance is same across fleet
• Vtrue & roll response differences between aircraft - Affected avoidance maneuvers and inflight wind 
calculations - resulted in need for tail number-specific configuration file in software
– Plan test profiles that will stimulate the software /avoidances in multiple ways / varying setups
• Otherwise risk missing unanticipated system responses
• NASA-Traveler has ~100 test profiles for 3 Monitors (GCAS, GeoFence, & Forced landing System)
– A Simulator /model can be very helpful in MMRTA software development, test matrix planning, and test 
mission prep, but NOT a valid substitute for MMRTA flight test
• Req’d fidelity of aircraft kinematics in sim/model depends upon the missions ops 
– Example: if not in constrained flight environment (not closely space multi-obstacles) then High-
fidelity of aircraft kinematics is likely NOT necessary
• But be careful to ensure data inputs to MMRTA within the sim/model match those provided from the 
actual flight autopilot/system hardware/software (axis systems, units, sign, etc)  45
What Did We Learn – Flight Test
Test Planning – cont’d
– Truth Source Data – KNOW the limitations of the aircraft parameters / data
• Position (lat / long / altitude) – Must understand your onboard-system’s accuracy, source (GPS aided?), 
drift,  etc
– This will drive whether independent / ground-based position measurement system is also needed
– Understand your earth-position axis system (i.e., is it WGS -84 or another system ??)
• Baro / pitot air data  (altitude, speed, etc) requirements for MMRTA system and data analysis depend 
upon aircraft operations:    example: pitot-tube derived airspeed may not be required if aircraft flies at 
constant airspeed (compute Vtrue from measured / fixed ground speed and atmosphere conditions)
• Consider calculating winds aloft – in majority of cases they are necessary or very helpful to MMRTA.   
– Essentially a MMRTA system design tradeoff of avoidance clearance vs nuisance avoidance
– Need driven by aircraft avoidance kinematics coupled with mission operations (i.e, are winds needed 
if flying between bldgs.?   Ground trajectory and distance of closest avoidance is function of [vehicle 
speed / wind speed]   
– Minimalize the baseline/COTS System reliance upon the System Under Test (SUT) for test safety and impact 
upon the COTS system performance
• Otherwise extremely difficult / impossible to isolate the SUT / MMRTA effects from the baseline
– Aircraft characteristics & operations will affect MMRTA data needs and test-analysis data needs
• For instance:   Does aircraft fly constant airspeed Or constant ground speed ?    Effect of consumables 
upon performance (e.g., fuel weight effect on turn performance) ?
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What Did We Learn – Flight Test
What Did We Learn – Flight Test
Test Execution
– In most instances sUAS flight test efficiency possibly more productive and almost as efficient as 
modeling/simulation
• Accurate modeling of most sUAS flight dynamics could be more costly than flight test
• Non-linear, or unpredictable influences are very difficult to model (wind eddys around buildings)
• Generally, sUAS flights are low cost, quick-turnaround, efficient, safe, etc
• Use virtual obstacles (GeoFences are by definition, virtual) greatly improved test efficiency and 
provides enormous test flexibility
– Did not have to travel to various ranges to utilize limited size/shaped terrain or obstacles
– Utilizing a safety pilot (SP) greatly reduces risk during testing
• Ensure the Pilot-take-control is independent of the SUT (Safety not provided by SUT during 
evaluation)
• Verification of Safety Pilot taking and keeping control is crucial (babble / mode switch testing)
– Plan for, & Gather data useful for postflight analysis that provides trend data over long periods of time 
or many flights that may /may not be useful for individual flights
• Examples:  Obtain independent (i.e., not from SUT) 3D position accuracy (not only during test 
profiles, but also takeoff AND landing to assess drift error over time), number and type of 
avoidance maneuvers during sorties, time history of winds aloft correlated with aircraft time, 
distance of closest approach during avoidance maneuvers
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What Did We Learn – Flight Test
• Flight test enabling interfaces simplified verification testing / troubleshooting of the system
– Implemented ability to turn monitors ON/OFF/Standby, thus providing improved test efficiency and 
better control of test buildup
• Improved ability to use virtual obstacles & GeoFences that could be “de-activated” when not 
needed in order to prevent interference
• Standby allows data capture without vehicle response
Standard Practice Review
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• Current standard is overly prescriptive to one 
design solution with only one possibly 
complex monitor. 
– Several current requirements drive one 
monitor architecture specifically.  
Example 5.6.1.1 “The RTA Switch shall 
receive a command from the Safety 
Monitor to use either the CF or one of the 
Recovery Control Functions.”
– Current EVAA architecture contains 
multiple monitors, each send a recovery 
command and consequence. (each 
monitor utilizes the predicted trajectory of 
its recovery commands to trigger)  The 
moral compass implements the highest 
consequence recovery. 
• One monitor solution could result in the 
monitor being a complex function.  
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Current EVAA MMRTA Framework
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Coupler
(Moral Compass)
*Note:  Recovery maneuvers are contained within monitors, but may be updated via 
configuration file for modularity / adaptability across platforms.
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• General recommendations:
– Eliminate requirements that prescribe one design solution
– Include design guidance section to fill gap between general requirements and recommended 
practices
– Include certification verification guidance section for the same reasons
• See lessons learned from testing / evaluation
– Include checks on recovery functions to ensure appropriate for the condition
– The document reads as though only UAS manufacturers would build these types of systems.  Third 
party entities are not accounted for in the guidance and should be.  (Applicants may not be UAS 
manufacturers)
– More detail should be provided on monitor performance vs complex function performance
• Avoid Nuisance RTA triggers …. i.e. Monitors should not look too far into the future / react so 
far out they limit the complex function unnecessarily 
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• 1.2 – “enabling highly automated UAS operations” … to include autonomous?
• 1.3 – “Certification challenges under DO-178C include generating required artifacts, such as 
requirements, elimination of unintended functionality, traceability/coverage, and test cases 
required for verification.”  … the issue isn’t in requirements definition, but instead adequate 
test case definition.
• 1.5.5 – “An RTA design with multiple RCFs should consider the aircraft state, relative 
outcomes, and differences in RTA recovery times in prioritizing the recovery actions in the 
Safety Monitor.” … include aircraft kinematics (might be what was meant by relative 
outcomes)
• 3.1 Definitions - “Safety Monitor – Continually monitors aircraft state including performance 
and functioning of the complex function to determine if the aircraft is or is predicted to exceed 
Pre-defined Limits. As necessary it will control the safety switch” … think you mean RTA 
Switch
• 5.1.3.1.2 – “The UAS manufacturer shall consider the impact to risk from the an incorrect 
action commanded by the Safety Monitor, RTA Switch, and/or the Recovery Control 
Function(s).”  … consider is unverifiable / open ended
• 5.1.5.1.1 – “Run-time assurance architecture”  … assuming you mean architecture description 
document
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• 5.1.5.2.2 – “Simulation and/or flight test results from anticipated environmental conditions and 
missions where the Recovery Control Function(s) are not expected to activate.” and 5.1.5.2.3 
– “Simulation and/or flight test results of stressing cases that cause the activation of all 
Recovery Control Function(s) relative to the Concept of Operations.”
– There are some significant limitations to simulation of sUAS, more is needed to substantiate 
function.  
• 5.1.5.4.2 - “Methods acceptable to the CAA may be used to identify the artifacts required for 
complex airborne electronic hardware.”  ... Confusing as CAA acceptable methods would by 
default have to be complied with
• 5.2.3.1.1 – “The UAS manufacturer should take into account the vehicle dynamics, 
environmental dynamics, and Safety Monitor thresholds in determining the frequency, 
accuracy, and precision requirements of each data element.” … depending on the data 
element this might need to be a shall (whether or not it feeds safety critical functions)
• 5.3.2.4 – “The RTA Input Manager should calculate and report estimated uncertainty of the 
measured state of the UAS resulting from deviations in precision, accuracy, and latency of the 
state variables.”  … overly prescriptive, uncertainty must be accounted for, but there are other 
ways to account for uncertainty than in the RTA Input Manager
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• 5.3.3.2 – “The UAS manufacturer should take into account the vehicle dynamics, 
environmental dynamics, and Safety Monitor thresholds in determining the precision, 
accuracy and latency requirements for each state variable.” … depending on the state 
variable this might need to be a shall (whether or not it feeds safety critical functions)
• 5.4 - Add an item that requires ‘sufficient isolation' between the complex function and the 
safety monitors.  The intent is to prevent the complex function from corrupting safety monitors 
processing or starving safety monitors of processing resources.
• 5.5.2.1 – “Each RCF shall be designed to provide a set of commands to account for 
contingencies that can occur in UAS operations.”  …  overly prescriptive to a particular design 
architecture (RCFs external to monitors), also requires each to handle all cases (specific 
contingencies)
• 5.7.2.3 – “The Safety Monitor shall determine the RCF Trigger Thresholds based on the RTA 
Recovery Time for each RCF.” … Overly prescriptive to a particular design architecture.  
Monitor with recovery functions included accounts for maneuver times to trigger appropriately
• 5.7.2.3.1 – “The RTA Recovery Time shall be calculated for each RCF based on UAS state 
and environment.” … Overly prescriptive to a particular design architecture.  These don’t have 
to be calculated real time it can be a look up table or worst case value
Review of ASTM Standard Practice
• 5.7.2.8.1 – “Each RTA Switch transition shall be timestamped and included in the recorded 
data to enable analysis of RCF reliance and nuisance RCF activations.” … need to include 
vehicle management system data as well.  
Considerations for Autonomous Systems 
Certification Framework / Approach
sUAS Functional Requirements
• Intersection of sUAS Functions (Aviate, Navigate, Communicate)  with 
Autonomy is dependent upon the  sUAS ConOps
– How/Where/When the sUAS is to be operated (i.e., its ConOps) drives risks.  
Mitigation of these risks is accomplished in the 3 functional areas:
• Aviate
– Avoidance:  Midair, terrain/obstacles, severe weather, & people/animals
– Degraded Control addressed at later date …..but contemplating capturing degraded control reqmts in 
categories that are dependent upon the Conops risk zones
– Basic Airworthiness (controlled flight & recovery) are independent of Autonomy safeguards
• Communicate
– Coordination with Airspace controlling agency
– Coordination with operator’s mission operations
• Navigate
– The “exposure” of the vehicle to the public due to Conops should also influence the 
rigor and processes for hardware & software development
• Hardware (e.g., DO-254), Software (DO-178B), and QA processes 
– Consider certification test matrix density as it relates to the overall system risk (think 
what probability with what confidence versus what consequence)
Midair Collision Avoidance
Terrain/Obstacle Avoidance
Severe Weather Avoidance
People/Animal Avoidance 
Functions
System 
Reqmts
ConOps – Influences Upon sUAS Reqmts
• ConOps – How, Where, & When the sUAS is utilized has major influence upon the 
sUAS Functional requirements.     ConOps can be Categorized into 2 dimensions:
– Mission Execution – what is the risk posed to people, obstacles, other vehicles as a result of the 
Mission ConOps?
• How the risks are mitigated drives the cert requirements and accomplished through the  Functional 
Categories (Aviate, Navigate, Communicate) 
– Environment – all weather?  Day/night?  Winds?      ……… also drives the certification 
requirements
Day/clear  VFR, 
calm winds
Mission 
Execution 
Risk
ConOps
All WX, 
night Ops
Low speed, operate above 
bldgs., rural flight area
High Speed, operate low 
altitude, near personnel
Environment 
Risk low
medium
high
Risk
Overlay the Impact of ConOps
on Functional Needs results in 
System Reqmts
ConOps
sUAS Cert – One Approach:  a Point/or 
Probability-Based Matrix
• Specify minimum # of points (or probability) that must be achieved in 
various Cert Categories
– The Categories pertain to the sUAS Functionality:  Aviate, Navigate, & Communicate
……….. And …………….
– The Categories are also dependent How / Where the sUAS is to be utilized (i.e., 
Conops:  Mission Execution & Environment)
• The Categories form a 3-D cross matrix of Functionality (1-D) vs ConOps
(2-D)
• ASTM / FAA must specify how the “points” or the necessary probabilities (with associated 
Confidence values) are achieved within each “cell” of Cert Matrix 
• This method provides freedom to the Cert Applicant on how they want to 
satisfy the Cert Requirements
– Make sure you protect against the requesting OEM “gaming” the MMRTA intent via 
narrow, non-robust implementation in 1 or more areas.
• Part of new sUAS /FAR 23 cert system should consider weaving robustness into the reqmts
3-D 
Matrix
Autonomy Cert Matrix- Example
Functional 
Requirements
Conops: Mission 
Execution
Mission Execution:  Within each “Goal”-Cell , 
prescribe a minimum # of points OR a probability 
value that must be achieved (the Cert-Goal value to 
be achieved is a function of the ConOps).
Mission Execution:  Within each “Actual”-
Cell , the cert applicant calculates the # of 
points OR a probability value achieved
Hardware Requirements
Software Development Processes 
Conops, 
Environment:
(day/night, rain, 
fog. etc): Overlay 
Weather 
considerations 
with Functional 
Reqmts & Mission 
Execution Conops
Matrix Example of 1 aspect of 
ConOps: Mission Execution - Persons 
/ Animals / Cars Avoidance
Calculate probability of 
striking person/animal/vehicle
• Exposure
• Kinetic Energy (speed,weight)
• Avoidance procedures
• Aircraft lighting/warning to 
people
• EVAA  performance
Goal: <0.02%
Achieved: <0.0125%
Next Steps
Next Steps
• Now to 31 Aug 17
– Data Reduction
– Complete Phase 1B – Evaluate monitor performance
– Generate / refine guidance based on findings – Requirements Development, Design, and 
Evaluation
• Potential Later Phases
– Improved FLS risk map development (automated based on real measurements)
– Incorporation of onboard sensing (less reliance on pre-defined data.  i.e. use terrain measurements 
rather than pre-defined database )
• Examples: LIDAR, Radar, Optical, Ground Based, Computer Vision, etc.
– Additional Monitors
• Examples:  Personnel Avoidance (personnel detection and communication of Intent), Air 
Vehicle Avoidance, Weather Avoidance, etc.
– Extended range operations
– Redundancy implications
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New vehicle requirements
Take Away
Take Away Points for Developing MMRTA
• Modular architecture with common generic elements
– Allow specific element development / modification with limited regression testing / verification.
– Accommodate expandability (E in EVAA)
– Strive to be as simple as possible while meeting requirements. Avoid unnecessary complexity in 
code and design of safety systems
– Configuration files allow for flexibility / expandability
• CVT JSON file to set list of parameters
• GCAS / GeoFence config files to set vehicle maneuvers
– One common data module / interface is essential for integrating multiple monitors (CVT)
– Each monitor only addresses one risk type
– Multiple monitors run simultaneously
– Monitors should not look too far into the future
• The further out they look the more uncertainty and associated nuisance triggers
• Keep the MMRTA system simple and deterministic, push complexity in to common mission 
manager systems
– Each module performs one task or function instead of several (avoid convolution)
Take Away Points for Developing MMRTA
• Minimize computational time to enable responsiveness in the system
– Solve discrete problems rapidly
– Use simplified models
– Implement simple rules / monitors for specific situations
– Consequence dictates priority
• Monitors should be kept independent (with guidance from requirements on how to interface 
with the MMRTA architecture) 
– They should not communicate with each other
– They should each only mitigate one safety risk
– They should run fast enough to respond faster than the situation can unfold
– Decision logic for monitor fights (Moral Compass) is crucial to ensure safe function and could easily 
get complex
• Consequence method (based on non-dimensionalized dollar impact) simplifies this problem
• Decisions only need to be made at rates which the combined system (MMRTA and vehicle) 
can respond to
– A Monitor acting alone should not be the cause of an incident
– With multiple Monitors, tackle the highest consequence first, minimizing harm
Take Away Points for Developing MMRTA
• Map data storage (indexing and datum) and usage needs to be clearly defined in the 
requirements provided to monitor developers. 
– Where in a tile does the lat, lon address actually exist?
– Posts can create situations where a scan is too small and is between posts and erroneously reports 
elevations.
– The horizontal and vertical datum used by the telemetry available from the vehicle should verified to 
match the map databases used by the system.
– If using a terrain database be sure you understand the impact of the source data upon your MMRTA 
system design:    i.e.,  is terrain data based on same axis system your aircraft uses? 
• Decision logic for monitor fights (Moral Compass) design/implementation is the critical 
element that will establish the perceived behavior of the system to the public
• Requirements Implementation should accommodate ease of verification
– Flight test enabling interfaces simplified verification testing / troubleshooting of the system
• Think organization (these types of systems can get complex, some software standards are 
key)
– Coding style guide and API guides were essential
– Naming conventions
Take Away Points for Developing MMRTA
• Strongly recommend calculating winds aloft – in majority of cases they are necessary or very 
helpful to MMRTA. 
– Does system counter winds automatically and stay on desired track/position … or not ?   
– Essentially a MMRTA system design tradeoff of avoidance clearance vs nuisance avoidance
– Need driven by aircraft avoidance kinematics coupled with mission operations (i.e, are wind values 
needed while flying between bldgs.?)   Ground trajectory and distance of closest avoidance is 
function of ratio of vehicle speed to wind speed   
• MMRTA should be safety focused not mission focused
Take Away Points for Testing MMRTA
• Evaluate system robustness
– Plan test profiles that will stimulate the software /avoidances in multiple ways / varying setups
• Otherwise risk missing unanticipated system responses
• NASA-Traveler has ~100 test profiles for 3 Monitors (GCAS, GeoFence, & Forced landing System)
– Testing must include off-nominal conditions &  should include testing outside operational envelope
• Winds > mission ops limits > published op envelope;   GPS jamming affects;    Reduced sensor-visibility
• Especially in Cert-matrix cells/subject areas where probability of occurrence or risk to personnel is above a 
tbd threshold
– Test matrix density, # of data samples
• Driven by Probability and Confidence vs. Consequence for total risk for a given system
• Plan for, & Gather data useful for postflight analysis that provides trend data over long periods 
of time or many flights that may /may not be useful for individual flights
– Examples:  Obtain independent (i.e., not from SUT) 3D position accuracy (not only during test 
profiles, but also takeoff AND landing to assess drift error over time), number and type of avoidance 
maneuvers during sorties, time history of winds aloft correlated with aircraft time, distance of closest 
approach during avoidance maneuvers
Take Away Points for Testing MMRTA
• Don’t assume the “advertised” baseline COTS aircraft performance if adding MMRTA to an 
existing aircraft – verify areas of need/interest
– Babble testing to ensure no unforeseen complications in data interface between system under test 
and COTS autopilot
– Compare a/c envelope against Mission ops demand.    Example: If operating in Denver, consider 
Density-Altitude effects (see supporting briefing slides)
– Wind effects upon departure susceptibility, avoidance maneuvers, cruise performance
• Don’t always assume a/c performance is same across fleet
– Vtrue & roll response differences between aircraft => Affected avoidance maneuvers and inflight 
wind calculations => resulted in need for Tail #-specific MMRTA / EVAA parameters in software
• A Simulator /model can be very helpful in MMRTA software development, test matrix 
planning, and test mission prep, but NOT a valid substitute for MMRTA flight test
– Req’d fidelity of aircraft kinematics in sim/model depends upon the missions ops 
• Example: if not in constrained flight environment (not closely space multi-obstacles) then High-
fidelity of aircraft kinematics is likely NOT necessary
Take Away Points for Testing MMRTA
• In most instances sUAS flight test efficiency possibly more productive and almost as efficient 
as modeling/simulation
– Accurate modeling of most sUAS flight dynamics could be more costly than flight test
– Non-linear, or unpredictable influences are very difficult to model (wind eddys around buildings)
– Generally, sUAS flights are low cost, quick-turnaround, efficient, safe, etc
• Utilizing a safety pilot (SP) greatly reduces risk during testing
– Ensure the Pilot-take-control is independent of the SUT (Safety not provided by SUT during 
evaluation)
– Verification of Safety Pilot taking and keeping control is crucial (babble / mode switch testing)
• Minimalize the baseline/COTS System reliance upon the System Under Test (SUT) for test 
safety and impact upon the COTS system performance
– Otherwise extremely difficult / impossible to isolate the SUT / MMRTA effects from the baseline
Backup
EVAA Consequence Matrix
• Non-dimensional consequence values assigned to each monitor maneuver output 
based on dollar values associated with loss.
Violation Consequence Dollar Value
Waypoint Following 0003
GeoFence Floor 0148 ~$20
GeoFence Wall 0295 ~$150
GeoFence-Ceiling 0325 ~$200
GCAS-Terrain 0774 ~$2,500
GCAS-Obstacles 1346 ~$12,500
FLS 0982 ~$5,000
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Map Manager
• Provides common set of interfaces to 
geo-referenced raster data.
• Hides details of reading and 
manipulating geo-referenced raster 
data from various data formats.
• Base class is a geo-referenced raster 
cell (GRC).
• A map is composed of a 2-D array of 
GRC cells. Cells are updated with 
new data as the vehicle moves.
• The map manager handles multiple 
layers of maps for different data 
types.
• Exposes interfaces to access data via 
shared memory.
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1 to N Map Layers
Map Manager Can Read Multiple File Types
• CDTM – Compressed Digital Terrain Map (NASA format)
– Highly compressed into tiles.  Decompressed and re-rasterized.
– Is not lossless compression.  Error limits are imposed on map compression based on end-user 
requirements.
– Typically rasterize to same resolution as source data.
• “Feature Data” – project-specific XML format.
– Easy for user to hand-edit file to add features such as power-lines, buildings, obstacles of various 
heights and shapes.
• “Format19” – Project-specific 1/9 arc second raster format.
– Will be used to hold obstacle data generated from LiDAR data.
• DTED – DOD Digital Terrain Elevation Data format
– Level 2 – 1 arc second resolution, integer elevation (meters)
• NED – National Elevation Data
– 1/3 arc second resolution, floating point
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Map Manager Logic to Read-In New Data
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Offset = ThresholdFactor * CellSize
Inner-threshold box
Offset
• Map is considered up-to-date if vehicle is 
located  within the inner-threshold box.
• New rows or columns are loaded in, and 
old rows or columns of data are ‘dropped 
off’ as needed to keep the vehicle location 
within the inner-threshold box.
Map Manager Indexing Scheme
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GRC Map Cell Array
2D Array of Indices to GRC Map Cell Array
This 2D array defines the 
contents of the 5x5 cell 
moving map.
1D Array of Indices to ‘Next’ Cells
1D Array to temporarily hold Indices to unused cells
This 1D array defines which cells will be 
used for reading in the next row or 
column of data, and then be copied into 
the 5x5 map.
This 1D array holds the indices of the cells being moved off 
of the 5x5 map, while the other cells are being shifted.  After 
the cells are shifted and the contents of this array are copied 
to the ‘Next’ array, the values in this array are set to a value 
that indicates the contained indices are invalid.
Using array of indices 
instead of array of 
pointers because it was 
found that pointers did not 
work well in shared 
memory between different 
threads.
Map Manager Shared Memory 
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1 to N Map Layers
Timer1
Map Control Interfaces:
• ConnectAsOwner()
• ConnectAsUser()
• Initialize(mapSelect, …)
• bMapsAreInitialized()
• SetMapCenter()
• UpdateMap()
Data Access Interfaces:
• GetElevAtPos()
• GetHighestPointWithinCircle()
• GetListOfPtsWithinCircle()
TimerInterfaces:
• ResetTimer1()
• GetTimer1TimeSinceReset_sec
()
SHARED MEMORY 
STRUCTURE
Map Manager Library Dependencies
80
UtilAlg UtilGrc
UtilDted
UtilCdtm
UtilNed
UtilFeatures
UtilGrcMap
Utilities UtilKml
Utilities 
Windows
Or
Utilities
Linux
UtilCdtmCompression
MapManager App
GEDACS App
Backup
The Traveler FLS (Forced Landing System) provides an emergency landing location and 
autopilot commands to minimize injury and property damage during an inflight emergency. 
Current implementation has two modes that are triggered by external command
Land Here 
Current location
Commanded Location
Search AreaLowest Cost 
Point within 
Search area
Emergency Trajectory
Land Immediately
Current locationEmergency Trajectory
Lowest Cost 
Point within 
Search area
Search Area
Search Area
Velodyne VLP-16 LiDAR
• 16 Lasers
• 360° Horizontal FOV
• ± 15° Vertical FOV
• 300,000 Points per Second
• 100m Range
• Will be used for
– Feature/Risk map generation
– Active Sensing
LiDAR System
Velodyne VLP-16 
LiDAR
Velodyne
Interface Box 
Garmin GPS
Javad Triumph-1
GX440 Modem
SBG INS Ellipse-D ANT-ACM-G5 
Antenna
Cell Tower
ANT-ACM-G5 
Antenna
GX440
Modem
LiDAR System Setup
LiDAR System Sample Data
LiDAR System Sample Data
